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CONFRONTATION
AFTER OHIO V. CLARK
Confrontation 
Requires Cross-
examination
Crawford established 
that cross-examination is 
a touchstone of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation 
Clause. Before Crawford, the 
court permitted judges to admit 
statements without face-to-face 
confrontation upon a finding that 
the statements bore sufficient 
indicia of reliability. Crawford 
abandoned that approach and 
instead divided accusatory 
statements into two camps: those 
that are testimonial and those that 
are not. Testimonial statements, 
the court said, were only 
admissible at trial if the declarant 
was unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.3 And though the 
court in Crawford did not fully 
define testimonial, it stated that 
“at a minimum,” the definition 
would include “prior testimony 
at a preliminary hearing, before 
a grand jury, or at a former trial; 
and to police interrogations.”4 
The statements in Crawford 
easily fit this definition. In 
Crawford, the defendant, who 
was accused of assault, claimed 
he acted in self-defense. His wife 
made statements during police 
interrogation that undermined 
his defense, but was unavailable 
to testify at trial. Because 
her statements to police were 
testimonial, admitting them 
without an opportunity for 
cross-examination violated the 
defendant’s right to confrontation.5
Confrontation 
Hinges on What’s 
“Testimonial” 
Since Crawford, the Supreme 
Court has honed its definition of 
testimonial. A statement qualifies 
as testimonial if, in light of all 
the circumstances, the primary 
purpose of the conversation was to 
“creat[e] an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony.”6 Under this 
primary purpose test, statements 
to police that prove past events 
continued on page 19
The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ohio v. Clark,1 provides 
an occasion to take stock 
of the Sixth Amendment 
Right to Confrontation 
since the court’s landmark 
2004 decision in Crawford 
v. Washington.2 Crawford 
strengthened a defendant’s 
right to confront his accusers 
face-to-face, underscoring 
that cross-examination is the 
constitutionally preferred 
method for testing the reliability 
of accusatory statements. 
Clark could eliminate that 
right in a wide range of cases 
where, although the reliability 
of a declarant’s out-of-court 
statements is critically important, 
a defendant has no right to 
confrontation.
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relevant to a criminal 
prosecution are 
testimonial, such as 
a sworn statement to 
police following a domestic violence incident, and a certified 
drug report from a forensic laboratory.7 
Statements to police during an ongoing emergency, 
however, are not testimonial if their primary purpose is to 
seek or render aid. Such non-testimonial statements include 
a victim’s call for help to a 911 emergency operator and 
a dying victim’s description of his assailant.8 The court 
acknowledged in Michigan v. Bryant that crime victims and 
police interrogators may act with mixed motives, prompted 
by a blend of safety, accusatory and investigatory concerns. 
But the court nonetheless concluded that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation in Michigan v. Bryant was “to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”9  
Justice Scalia, who authored Crawford and dissented 
Michigan v. Bryant, criticized the court for embracing 
such a “malleable approach,” which affords judges broad 
discretion in deciding what is testimonial and thus when the 
Confrontation Clause applies.10 
Clark Limits Confrontation
Clark addressed the recurring challenge of confronting 
child victims of abuse. Child witnesses have long been 
controversial based on concerns about their reliability, 
truthfulness, suggestibility and memory.11 Evidentiary laws 
aim to shield child victims of abuse from the further trauma 
of confronting their abusers in court.12 
Clark concerned statements made by a three-year-old 
boy to his pre-school teachers, who questioned him about 
injuries on his face and arms. The pre-school teachers,  
who were required by law to report suspected 
child abuse, asked the child, L.P.,  
“[W]hat happened?” and “Who did 
this?”13 L.P. was “bewildered” and 
gave inconsistent answers: he 
initially said nothing, then 
claimed that he fell, and, finally, 
incriminated the 
defendant (Clark).14 
Because the child’s 
statements were the 
only direct evidence against Clark, his counsel would have 
been keenly interested in probing those inconsistencies and 
testing the child’s credibility.
But L.P. was deemed incompetent to testify at trial due 
to his young age, so Clark never got to cross-examine him.15 
Instead, the child’s statements were deemed reliable and 
admitted through other witnesses. Clark claimed that his 
inability to confront the child violated Crawford. Although 
the Ohio Supreme Court agreed, the United States Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the boy’s statements were not 
testimonial, meaning Clark had no right to confront him.
The court’s analysis in Clark turned on three key facts: 
the statements were made to a teacher (not law enforcement), 
during an “ongoing emergency” and by a three-year-old 
child. Statements “made to preschool teachers, not the 
police,” the court explained “are much less likely to be 
testimonial than statements made to law enforcement 
officers.”16 The teachers’ status as mandatory reporters, did 
not convert them into law enforcement officers.17 Further, 
the boy’s teacher elicited his statement during “an ongoing 
emergency,” because the pre-school “needed to know 
whether it was safe to release L.P. to his guardian at the 
end of the day.”18 So, as in Michigan v. Bryant, learning 
the suspect’s identity, though obviously investigatory, was 
considered necessary to quell a safety concern. 
The Upshot
Clark will constrict defendants’ ability to confront 
child accusers. This is because in Clark, the Supreme Court 
broadly suggested that “[s]tatements by very young children 
will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause,” 
because it is “extremely unlikely that a three-year old child in 
L.P.’s position would intend his statements to be a substitute 
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for trial testimony.”19 
Clark may not 
reshape existing cases 
in Nevada, but it will 
narrow and simplify confrontation analysis. In Nevada, child 
statements about abuse are testimonial when made during 
interviews with law enforcement or child protective services.20 
Nevada cases have treated statements to nurses or doctors as 
testimonial,21 but they may not be considered so under Clark, 
especially if the victim is very young, or if safety concerns 
predominate. Further, Clark may raise questions about 
when a child is considered very young, or not old enough to 
understand that her statements will be shared with police, or 
that the person asking questions is part of law enforcement 
or functionally equivalent. Courts will grapple with these 
questions. But whereas Crawford was a thumb on the scale 
favoring confrontation, Clark appears to be the opposite.
Clark breaks new ground by suggesting several new 
default rules, namely that statements to non-police, statements 
by young children and statements elicited based on safety 
concerns are not testimonial under Crawford. Overall, Clark 
limits a defendant’s right to confront his accusers.  
Crawford courts have focused, somewhat myopically, on 
whether out-of-court statements are testimonial, as the sole 
determinant of whether 
the defendant has the 
right to confrontation. 
What has fallen out of 
view is the value of cross-examination; whether it would 
assist the factfinder in assessing the credibility of a declarant 
whose accusations are critical to guilt or whose reliability is 
already at issue. Crawford railed against the courts usurping 
the factfinder’s role in assessing the reliability of accusatory 
statements. Clark shows that the court’s narrow definition 
of “testimonial” may lead to even less confrontation, cross-
examination and adversarial testing than before Crawford.  
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